> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.parmanasystems.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # The Execution Pipeline > Stage by stage: what runs on every request through the default server today, updated to reflect the gateway now being wired unconditionally. **This page previously said stages 5-6 (gateway, connector enforcement) are not invoked by the default server.** That was true through commit `4740aee` (2026-07-08). As of `651497a` (2026-07-11), they run on every request. See [The gateway](/concepts/the-gateway) for the current mechanism and its one real caveat: only one connector is registered. ## Stage-by-stage status | Stage | What it does | Status | Evidence | | ----------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | 1. Accept Business Transaction | Validates trust-chain invariants (IDs match across the chain, policy/action present) | \[AVAILABLE] | `BusinessTransactionValidator`, `packages/runtime/src/validators/BusinessTransactionValidator.ts` | | 2. Policy evaluation | Loads the exact referenced policy (name+version), evaluates signals against sequential rules, first match wins | \[AVAILABLE] | `PolicyRouter`, `PolicyEngine`, CLAIMS.md 2.2/2.3 | | 3. Execution gate | Refuses to execute when the Decision is not `APPROVED` or required trust artifacts are missing | \[AVAILABLE] | `ExecutionGate`, `TrustChainValidationComponent`, CLAIMS.md 2.4 | | 4. Signed Execution Authorization | Signs a payload scoped to one Decision, bound to a single-use nonce, valid only within a bounded window, only after the gate approves | \[AVAILABLE] | `RuntimeAuthorizationSigner`, CLAIMS.md 2.8/2.12 | | 5. Execution Gateway (content-binding) | Recomputes the executable-content hash, compares to the authorization's `businessTransactionHash`, rejects a mismatch before consuming the nonce | \[AVAILABLE], wired into the default server unconditionally | `ExecutionGateway.ts:141-195`; see [The gateway](/concepts/the-gateway) | | 6. Credential Isolation / Connector Enforcement | Resolves a credential handle inside the Gateway boundary, then forwards verified content to the target system through a capability-checked Connector | \[AVAILABLE] for the one registered connector (`vendor-payment`); reaching a second connector requires a bootstrap code change | `packages/connector-sdk/src/{HttpConnector,MockConnector,SdkConnectorExecutor}.ts`, `packages/api/src/bootstrap/createConnectorRegistry.ts` | | 7. Execution Trust Record | Assembles the immutable record: transaction, executions, overrides, verifications, receipts, canonical hash, signature | \[AVAILABLE] | `ExecutionTrustRecordBuilder`, CLAIMS.md 2.5 | | 8. Verification | Recomputes hash, verifies signature, checks authorization binding on every `APPROVED` execution | \[AVAILABLE], exactly 3 checks | `VerificationService`, CLAIMS.md 2.15 | | 9. Replay | Genuinely re-evaluates the recorded policy decision, scoped to one execution, disconnected from the API | \[PARTIAL] | See [Replay](/replay/overview) | ## What actually runs when you call `POST /execute` today All nine stages run, in order, on every request. Stage 6's connector enforcement is real only for the `payments:execute` action, the one connector wired into `createConnectorRegistry.ts`, an action with no matching connector fails closed with "No connector registered for action," it does not silently skip stages 5-6, see [The gateway](/concepts/the-gateway) for the mechanism and [Quickstart](/quickstart) for a verified live run through all nine stages. ## Fail-closed properties that do hold today * A rejected Decision **never** produces a Signed Execution Authorization, authorization signing happens only after `executionGate.enforce()` approves (`packages/runtime/src/RuntimeEngine.ts`, CLAIMS.md 2.12, `packages/runtime/test/execution-authorization-wiring.test.ts`, "rejected transaction produces no authorization"). It throws rather than returning a rejected result, see [Write your first policy](/guides/write-your-first-policy). * Signing or verifying with the wrong key type (e.g. an Ed25519 key against an ML-DSA-65 provider) fails closed with a named error rather than silently dispatching on the key's own type (`assertKeyType`, CLAIMS.md 2.13). * The Trust Record's `authorizationId` is part of the canonically-hashed content, not attached alongside it, tampering with it changes the recomputed hash (CLAIMS.md 2.11).