> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.parmanasystems.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Chapter 10: The Execution Gateway > ExecutionGateway implements @parmana/execution-system's ExecutionSystem interface, the ## A correction, first An older architecture document in this repository assumed `ExecutionGateway` lives at `packages/api/src/execution-gateway/ExecutionGateway.ts`. That path does not exist. The real, current location is `packages/execution-gateway/src/ExecutionGateway.ts`, a separate, top-level package, not something nested inside `packages/api`. This chapter is written directly from that real file. ## What it is `ExecutionGateway` implements `@parmana/execution-system`'s `ExecutionSystem` interface, the same seam `RuntimeFactory.create()` (Chapter 8) accepts any implementation of. Its own class doc comment calls it "the sole release boundary" for whichever `Connector` it's constructed with: no execution reaches a connector without passing through this gateway's full verification sequence first. ## Why it was built A signed `ExecutionAuthorizationPayload` (Chapter 9) proves a decision was made, but something still has to actually check that proof before letting a connector run, and that something needs to independently re-verify, not just trust, every claim the envelope makes, including claims about the world having stayed the same since the envelope was signed (the policy hasn't changed, the underlying signals haven't drifted). `ExecutionGateway` composes `@parmana/envelope-verifier`'s `EnvelopeVerifier` (signature/expiry/TTL/nonce) and adds two further checks of its own: a content-hash recompute-and-compare, and, when wired, policy-freshness and signal-freshness checks against the *current* state of the world, not just the state at authorization time. ## How it works Construction (`ExecutionGatewayOptions`) requires a `publicKey` (or a `keyProvider` for keyId-aware, rotation-safe lookup) and a `nonceStore`, and exactly one of a `connector` or an `executionControl` (constructing with both, or neither, throws immediately). Optional `policyRepository` and `signalStateVerifier` enable the two additive checks below; omitting either skips that specific check rather than failing closed on it. `verify(request, now)` runs the checks in this exact order, quoted directly from the class doc comment, "Session 3's ordering rule: side-effect-free checks first, nonce consumed last and only on success": 1. `version -> signature -> expiry -> TTL policy` (all inside `EnvelopeVerifier.verifyChecks()`). 2. `businessTransactionHash` recompute-and-compare, only attempted if step 1 passed. 3. `policyStillCurrent` recompute-and-compare (when a `PolicyRepository` is wired and the authorization carries a `policyContentHash`), recomputes the *current* content hash of the named policy and compares it to what the authorization was signed under. If the policy no longer exists at all (e.g. replaced in place by a governed change), this is treated identically to a content mismatch, not a separate error case. 4. `signalsStillCurrent` recompute-and-verify (when a `SignalStateVerifier` is wired and both the request and authorization carry signals/`signalsHash`), first a hash comparison (catching a request whose signals were altered after authorization), then an independent re-verification of those signals against real-world state via the verifier. 5. **Nonce consumption, last, only if every prior check passed.** This is the only side-effecting check in the sequence, "a mismatched or forged request must not burn a nonce." `execute(request)` calls `verify()`, and on any failure throws, specifically, `NonceAlreadyConsumedError` when nonce replay is the *sole* failing check (every other check passed), or a generic `Error` naming every failing check and both hash values on a content mismatch otherwise. `isSoleFailureNonceReplay()` is the precise logic for that distinction: strip out `nonceUnseen`, and check every remaining value is `true` or `undefined` (an undefined check means "skipped," which still counts as passing for this purpose). On success, the verified `executableContent` is deep-frozen and handed to either the legacy `Connector` interface (`this.connector.execute(...)`) or the newer `executionControl` path (a `service.execute(...)` call with a freshly minted or static `gatewayAuthentication` value, or an `ExecutionChannel.release(...)` call for the deprecated channel-based path). ## How it enables things, with examples * `examples/tutorials/34-execution-gateway`, the gateway directly. * `examples/tutorials/33-execution-boundary`, the boundary concept: what does and doesn't cross it. * `examples/tutorials/32-execution-pipeline`, the gateway inside the larger pipeline. * `examples/tutorials/81-connector-execution-gateway`, a real connector behind the gateway. * `examples/tutorials/86-gateway-attestation`, attestation semantics at this boundary. ## How to validate this yourself * `packages/execution-gateway/src/ExecutionGateway.ts`, the full verification sequence; every ordering and failure-handling claim above is a direct comment or method in this file. * `packages/execution-gateway/src/GatewayVerificationResult.ts`, the structured result shape (`checks`, `hashMismatch`, `policyContentMismatch`, `signalsHashMismatch`, `signalDivergence`). * `packages/execution-gateway/tests/unit/execution-gateway.test.ts`, the primary unit coverage. * `packages/execution-gateway/tests/unit/execution-gateway.dilithium3.test.ts`, the same gateway logic under a post-quantum signature algorithm (see Chapter 3). * `packages/execution-gateway/tests/unit/credential-non-exposure.test.ts`, a separate but closely related guarantee this package also carries, covered in full in Chapter 11 (Credential Isolation). ## Integration requirements * A public key (or `KeyProvider`) matching whatever signed the authorizations this gateway will verify. * A `NonceStore` implementation, `MemoryNonceStore` for tests/tutorials, `SupabaseNonceStore` (via the storage layer, Chapter 13) for a real deployment, so replay protection survives a process restart. * To enable policy-freshness checking: a `PolicyRepository` (Chapter 4/13) pointed at the same policy content the signing side used. * To enable signal-freshness checking: a `SignalStateVerifier` (Chapter 5) capable of re-deriving the relevant real-world facts. * Exactly one of a `Connector` implementation or an `executionControl` configuration , Chapter 12 covers what a real `Connector` looks like.