docs/connectors/CONNECTING_AN_AGENT.md points here. For what happens after
approval (gateway, connector, the real business system), see Connect any
external system, the Connector
Development Guide and
docs/connectors/PAYTM_CONNECTOR.md.The mental model
What you need, and why
Step by step
1. Read the policy file directly.cat policies/customer-refund/1.2.0/policy.json; don’t guess
field names from a description. Ask the server which version is in effect:
GET /policies/in-effect?capability=paytm:refund.
2. Pick the exact capability string. Case- and character-exact. This single detail is the most
common integration failure in practice.
3. Mint a scoped API key:
SERVICE, never "AGENT", that value doesn’t exist in AuthorityType. Never grant "*" to a
single-purpose agent; /callers/me’s unrestrictedCapabilities is literally
allowedCapabilities.includes("*").
4. Verify the key before writing agent code:
signalsSchema. Not a
placeholder to fix later, from day one.
6. Build the request:
policy.name/policy.version is never inferred from intent.action: name it explicitly, or a
caller could pair a real capability with an unrelated policy. Under customer-refund 1.2.0 every
refund needs a signed manager approval (G-75); without one the request is refused with 403 POLICY_DENIED, whatever your agent declares about eligibility and fraud.
7. Send it, handle the response, see the complete reference table below.
8. Confirm a connector is registered for your capability on this deployment. A 200 means
the action was released and executed and its Trust Record signed; with no connector the answer is
503 CONNECTOR_NOT_REGISTERED and nothing ran. To practise end to end with nothing installed, use
the public sandbox’s sandbox:receipt (Playground). To connect your own system
without code, see Connect any external system.
9. Verify independently: GET /refusal/:id + POST /refusal/verify for a rejection,
GET /trust-records/:id (only once a connector is wired) for an execution, or fully offline with
verifyExecutionTrustRecordOffline.
Complete response reference
Every row is what the server returns today (2026-10-02); the Error catalog has every code.Common mistakes
- Capability string mismatch between
intent.actionand your key’sallowedCapabilities. authorityType: "AGENT", invalid; use"SERVICE".- A signal inferred from the customer’s words instead of an independent business system.
- Treating
POLICY_DENIEDas a bug instead of a correct decision. - Treating a timeout as a failure and sending the action again under a new id.
- Granting
"*"“to get it working” and never narrowing it. - Hand-editing
PARMANA_API_KEYSby pasting a single entry instead of the complete array. - Assuming a bare
500means your request was wrong: ask for the server log first.
Reference implementation
pavancharak/parmana-phinite-agent is a real, working implementation of every step above. Two bugs
were found and fixed in it: the exact CAPABILITY_NOT_ALLOWED mistake from the table above
("refund" instead of "paytm:refund"), and error handling that crashed instead of resolving
unrecognized failures to an unresolved client-side state. See that repository’s README for the full
writeup.
Second round, entirely on Parmana’s own side (2026-09-15/16): after those agent-side fixes, this
same integration hit a sequence of purely Parmana-operator issues onboarding as a new caller on a
freshly KMS-migrated deployment: no PARMANA_API_KEYS entry at all (401) → a malformed hand-edited
entry (500 for every caller) → no allowedPrincipalIds grant for the asserted principal (403) → a
genuine Parmana-side bug where the gateway’s signing and verification paths silently used different
keys after a KMS migration (500, unrelated to the request itself ,
examples/tutorials/114-signing-verification-key-agreement/ reproduces it). None of these were agent
bugs. Full account: the 2026-09-15 KMS migration troubleshooting guide (in git history).