Verify a signed caller-authentication audit event
Verifies a signed caller-authentication audit event’s signature, the same unauthenticated, third-party-verifiable capability as POST /refusal/verify, over the durable caller_audit_events audit trail instead of Refusal Records. No database lookup involved, pure signature-over-bytes verification against the event and signature supplied in the request body. Only production (Supabase) audit sinks sign; in-memory test sinks never produce a genuinely valid signature for this route to confirm.
Body
Request body for POST /audit/verify: the signed caller-authentication audit event and its stored signature, not a lookup by ID. Checked structurally on the server before signature verification runs. Verification operates on canonical bytes and the signature alone, never on event.type.
The caller-authentication audit event as stored. Only type, occurredAt, and route are structurally required; the event may carry further fields depending on what produced it.
The signature stored alongside the event. Only production (Supabase) audit sinks sign; in-memory test sinks never produce a genuine one of these.
Response
Verification completed. A 200 does not by itself mean the signature verified, see the valid field.
Response shared by POST /refusal/verify and POST /audit/verify: a bare signature-validity result, no wrapper, no partial-failure detail. Both routes verify a signature over bytes with no database lookup, so there is nothing more specific to report than valid or not.
Whether the signature verifies against Parmana's public key for the stated algorithm and key ID.